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INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS

measure has caused a complaining member.39 If, as the Appellate Body suggested, the evidence does not support the view that the Byrd Amendment has resulted in the filing of more
petitions than would have been the case without it, it is hard to see how the measure would
have caused a complainant any compensable loss. It will be interesting to see how the complainants try to surmount this difficult problem.
MARK L. MOVSESIAN

Hofstra Law School

Arbitration-NAFTA Chapter I 1-relationshipof arbitraltribunalsto domestic courts--courtjudgments
as measures-denialofjustice-requirementofjudicialfinality-requirementof continuous nationality-lack of retrospective effect
LOEWEN GROUP, INC. V. UNITED STATES. ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3.42 ILM 811 (2003).

At <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf>.
NAFrA Chapter 11 Arbitral Tribunal, June 26, 2003.
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2. 42 ILM 85
(2003). At <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/14442.pdf>.
NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitral Tribunal, October 11, 2002.
MONDEV INTERNATIONAL LTD. V. UNITED STATES.

In two recent awards, Loewen Group,Inc. v. United Statesand Mondev InternationalLtd. v. United
States, arbitral tribunals rejected claims that U.S. court decisions violated Chapter 11 of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).' These awards not only articulate standards
for "denial ofjustice" claims under NAFTA, but also address difficult questions regarding the
relationship between Chapter 11 tribunals and domestic courts.
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States
The claim in Loewen grew out of a business dispute betweenJeremiah O'Keefe, the owner
of a funeral home in Mississippi, and the Loewen Group, Inc. (LG), a Canadian chain of
funeral homes that was expanding its operations in the United States. After attempts to reach
a settlement failed, O'Keefe's contract, tort, and state-law antitrust claims went to trial before
a Mississippi jury, which awarded O'Keefe $500 million dollars in damages, including $75
million for emotional distress and $400 million in punitive damages. Mississippi law requires
a 125% bond to stay execution ofajudgment pending appeal. When the Mississippi Supreme
Court refused to reduce the required bond, LG settled the case for $175 million. LG and its
owner, Raymond Loewen, then brought claims against the United States under NAFTA Chapter 11, arguing that the trial court violated Article 1102 (national treatment) and Article 1105
(minimum standard of treatment) by allowing prejudicial comments about nationality, racial
attitudes, and economic class, that the $500 million verdict and the bond requirement were
denials ofjustice in violation of Article 1105, and that the end result was an expropriation
under Article 1110.
'9 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Art. 22.4,
MARRAKESH AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Annex 2, in THE LEGAL TEXTS, supra

note 1, at 354.
'North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17,1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 ILM 289 & 605 (1993) [hereinafter
NAFTA].
2 Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, ICS1D Case No. ARB(AF) /98/3 (NAFrA Ch. 11 Arb. TribJune 26,2003),

42 ILM 811, at<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf> [hereinafter Loewen award (merits)].
Publicly released documents on all NAFFA disputes are available online at <http://www.naftalaw.org>.
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After the arbitral tribunal was constituted,3 the United States raised preliminary objections
to its competence on the ground that the Mississippijudgments were not "measures adopted
or maintained by a Party."4 In its award on jurisdiction,5 the tribunal rejected the United States'
argument thatjudicial acts in litigation between private parties are not "measures." It noted
that Article 201 defines "measure" broadly to include "any law, regulation, procedure, requirement or practice," that other provisions of NAFTA indicate thatjudicial decisions may be measures, and that general principals of state responsibility make states responsible for the acts
of their courts. The tribunal found no basis in NAFTA or in international law for excluding
court judgments in private disputes.6
The United States further argued that the Mississippijudgments were not "adopted or maintained by a Party," because "State responsibility only arises when there is final action by the
State'sjudicial system as a whole."7 Apparently in order to avoid the argument that Article 1121
of NAFTA waives the procedural-exhaustion requirement of the local remedies rule,8 the United
States characterized the rule ofjudicial finality as a substantive requirement of denial ofjustice claims. 9 The tribunal expressed skepticism, stating that "the rule ofjudicial finality is no
different from the local remedies rule. Its purpose is to ensure that the State where the violation occurred should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the framework of its own domestic legal system." ° In the end, however, the tribunal decided to consider
the argument later-at the hearing on the merits." LG subsequently filed for bankruptcy,
from which it emerged as a U.S. corporation, with its Chapter 11 claims assigned to a new
Canadian subsidiary.
In its award on the merits, the tribunal concluded "that the conduct of the trial by the trial
judge was so flawed that it constituted a miscarriage ofjustice amounting to a manifest injustice as that expression is understood in international law."' 2 The tribunal faulted the trial
judge for allowing several different kinds of prejudicial behavior: repeated references to LG's
nationality," suggestions that LG did business only with white people, 4 and appeals to classbased prejudice.' 5 The tribunal also faulted the irregular manner in which the trial judge
accepted thejury's initial verdict on compensatory damages but directed it to reconsider the
16
question of punitive damages.
The tribunal focused on NAFTA Article 1105 (1) because LG had not provided sufficient
evidence of how U.S. investors were treated to allow an evaluation of LG's Article 1102 claim
' The tribunal initially comprised Sir Anthony Mason (president),Judge AbnerJ. Mikva, and L. Yves Fortier.
After the award on jurisdiction but prior to the award on the merits, Fortier resigned from the tribunal and was
replaced by Lord Mustill.
4
NAFrA, supra note 1, Art. 1101(1).
Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, Competence andJurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (NAFrA

Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.Jan. 5,2001), at<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/3921.pdf> [hereinafter Loewen
award (jurisdiction)].

' Id., paras. 39-54.
7
Id., para. 61.
See infra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
Loewen award (jurisdiction), supra note 5, para. 61.
'o

Id., para. 71.

"Id., para. 74.

Loewen award (merits), supra note 2, para. 54.
Id., paras. 56-64.
4 Id., paras. 65-67.

IS

1d., paras. 68-70. The tribunal excused LG's failures to object to such comments, reasoning that "[in ajury
trial,.., counsel are naturally reluctant to create the impression, by continuously objecting, that they are seeking
to suppress relevant evidence or that they are relying on technicalities," id., para. 73, and found that LG had preserved its claims by requesting ajury instruction addressing nationality, racial, and class bias, id., paras. 84-87.
" Id., paras. 88-114, 122.
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(national treatment) and because its Article 1110 claim (expropriation) was simply duplicative. "Article 1105(1) provides: "Each party shall accord to investments of investors of another
party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security.""i Although LG did not establish that thejudge orjury was
actually biased against it, 9 the tribunal concluded that "bad faith or malicious intention" was
not required.2" "Manifest injustice in the sense of a lack of due process leading to an outcome
which offends a sense ofjudicial propriety is enough . . . ."" In this case, the tribunal said
that "the whole trial and its resultant verdict were clearly improper and discreditable and
cannot be squared with minimum standards of international law and fair and equitable
treatment."

22

Nevertheless, the tribunal rejected LG's Article 1105 claim because LG had failed to pursue its domestic remedies. This conclusion required "qualification" of the tribunal's statement in the award on jurisdiction that "the rule ofjudicial finality is no different from the24
local remedies rule." 23Upon reflection, the tribunal concluded that the rules were distinct
and that whatever impact Article 1121 might have on the local remedies rule with respect to
nonjudicial measures, "it says nothing expressly about the requirement that, in the context
of ajudicial violation of international law, the judicial process be continued to the highest
level." 25 The tribunal continued:
" Id., paras. 140-41.
18

NAFA, supra note 1,Art. 1105(1). OnJuly 31,2001, the NAFTAFree Trade Commission, comprising represen-

tatives from the three NAFTA parties, issued an interpretation of Article 1105(1), limiting "international law" to
customary international law and stating that "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" were not
meant to go beyond the protections of customary international law:
B. Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with International Law
1.

Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens
as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors of another Party.

2.

The concepts of "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and security" do not require treatment in addition to or beyond thatwhich is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.

3.

A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of the NAFTA, or of a separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of Article 1105(1).

Free Trade Commission ClarificationsRelated toNAFTA Chapter11 (July 31, 2001), at <http://www.ustr.gov/regions/
whemisphere/nafta-chapterl 1.PDF>. Although claimants had argued that the interpretation amounted to an unauthorized amendment of Chapter 11, they did not press the argument. The tribunal concluded that the interpretation was binding on it under NAFTA Article 1131 (2). Loewen award (merits), supra note 2, paras. 124-28; compare
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, Damages, para. 47 (NAFTA Ch. II Arb. Trib. May 31, 2002), 41 ILM 1347, 1356 (2002)
("were the Tribunal required to make a determination whether the Commission's action is an interpretation or
an amendment, it would choose the latter").
19 Loewen award (merits), supranote 2, para. 138.
20 Id., para. 132.
21Id. The tribunal also quoted with approval two other formulations of a standard for denial ofjustice: (1) the
formulation of the Mondev tribunal, id. para. 133, see infra note 47 and accompanying text; and (2) a phrase from
the ELSIcase on which the tribunal in Pope & Talbot, para. 63,41 ILM at 1358, had relied. SeeLoewen award (merits),
supra note 2, para. 131 (quoting Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 ICJ REP. 15, 76 (July 20) ("It is
a wilful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense ofjuridical propriety.")).
2' Loewen award (merits), supranote 2, para. 137.
21Id., paras. 158-59; see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
24 Loewen award (merits), supra note 2, paras. 142-56.
215Id., para. 161. As a condition precedent to submitting a claim, Article 1121 requires the investor and the

enterprise to
waive their right to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court under the law of any Party,
or other dispute settlement procedures, any proceedings with respect to the measure of the disputing Party
that is alleged to be a breach .... except for proceedings for injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary
relief, not involving the payment of damages, before an administrative tribunal or court under the law of the
disputing Party.
NAFTA, supranote 1, Arts. 1121 (1) (b) & 1121(2) (b). LG argued that Article 1121 "requires an arbitral claimant
to waive its local remedies, not exhaust them." Loewen award (merits), supra note 2, para. 145.
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If Article 1121 were to have that effect, it would encourage resort to NAFTA tribunals
rather than resort to the appellate courts and review processes of the host State, an outcome which would seem surprising, having regard to the sophisticated legal systems of the
NAFTA Parties.... Further, it is unlikely that the Parties to NAF7A would have wished
to encourage recourse to NAFTA arbitration at the expense of domestic appeal or review
when, in the general run of cases, domestic appeal or review would offer more wideranging review as they are not confined to breaches of international law.26
The rule ofjudicial finality imposes "an obligation to exhaust remedies which are effective
and adequate and are reasonably available to the complainant in the circumstances in which
it is situated."27 Although the bond requirement meant that appeal to the Mississippi Supreme
Court was not "a reasonably available remedy,"28 LG also had the alternative of filing a petition for certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court challenging the bond requirement as a due
process violation and seeking a stay. "[T] he central difficulty in Loewen's case," the tribunal
concluded, was that "Loewen failed to present evidence disclosing its reasons for entering into
the settlement agreement in preference to pursuing other options, in particular the Supreme
Court option ... "29
The tribunal further reasoned that LG's reorganization in bankruptcy as a U.S. corporation deprived the tribunal ofjurisdiction." ° NAFTA Chapter 11 applies only to measures of
one NAFTA party relating to investors of anotherNAFTA party or their investments.3 Under
customary international law, "there must be continuous national identity from the date of the
events giving rise to the claim, which date is known as the dies a quo, through the date of the
resolution of the claim, which date is known as the dies ad quem."32 Although some treaties have
altered the requirement of continuous nationality, "such specific provisions in other treaties
and agreements only hinder [LG] 's contentions, since NAFTA has no such specific provision."3
LG's attempt to satisfy the continuous nationality requirement by assigning its claims to a new
Canadian subsidiary with no other assets was unavailing. "All of the benefits of any award
would clearly inure to the American corporation. Such a naked entity as Nafcanco, even with
its catchy name, cannot qualify as a continuing national for the purposes of this proceeding." 4
Finally, the tribunal offered a word of explanation for why it had declined to correct what
it saw as a clear miscarriage ofjustice. Emphasizing the limits of Chapter 11 review, the tribunal
stated:
As we have sought to make clear, we find nothing in NAFTA tojustify the exercise by this
Tribunal of an appellate function parallel to that which belongs to the courts of the host
nation. In the last resort, a failure by that nation to provide adequate means of remedy
may amount to an international wrong but only in the last resort.... Too great a readiness to step from outside into the domestic arena, attributing the shape of an international wrong to what is really a local error (however serious), will damage both the integrity
of the domestic judicial system and the viability of NAFTA itself.3 5
26Loewen award (merits), supranote 2, para. 162.
21Id., para. 168.

28Id., para. 208. The tribunal concluded that the refusals of the trial judge and the Mississippi Supreme Court
to reduce the bond were not themselves violations of Article 1105. Id., paras. 189, 197.
Id., para. 215.
"This holding would seem to render the rest of the award unnecessary, but the tribunal explained: "As our consideration of the merits of the case was well advanced when Respondent filed this motion to dismiss [for lack ofjurisdiction] and as we reached the conclusion that Claimants' NAFrA claims should be dismissed on the merits, we
include in this Award our reasons for this conclusion." Id., para. 2.
31

NAFA, supra note 1, Art. 1101 (1).

32Loewen award (merits), supra note 2, para. 225.
23Id., para. 229.
4Id., para. 237.
s'Id., para. 242.
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Mondev Internationalv. United States
The claim in Mondev36 arose out of a real estate development contract concluded in 1978
between the City of Boston (City), the Boston RedevelopmentAuthority (BRA), and Lafayette
Place Associates (LPA), a limited partnership owned by the Canadian company Mondev International Ltd. One provision of this contract gave LPA the option to purchase a piece of land
known as the Hayward Parcel byJanuary 1, 1989, at a price calculated by a formula in the
contract. The City, believing the option price to be too low in light of the intervening surge
in real estate prices, allegedly tried to frustrate exercise of the option. LPA had leased its rights
in the project to Campeau, another Canadian developer, which notified the City in December
1988 that it wished to buy the parcel. Campeau never made a formal tender of payment, however, and LPA terminated the lease after Campeau defaulted on its obligations. Subsequently,
Manufacturers Hanover Trust foreclosed on both LPA's and Campeau's interests in the project.
In March 1992, LPA brought suit in Massachusetts state court against the City for breach
of contract and against BRA for intentional interference with contractual relations. Thej ury
found for LPA on both claims, but the trialjudge set aside the tort judgment on the ground
that BRA was immune from liability for intentional torts under a Massachusetts statute. On
appeal, the Massachusetts SupremeJudicial Court (SJC) affirmed BRA's tort immunity and
reversed thejudgment against the City for breach of contract. In a unanimous opinion authored
byJustice Charles Fried, the SJC held that LPA could not claim that the City was in breach,
because LPA had not formally tendered its own performance under the option. The U.S.
Supreme Court denied LPA's petition for certiorari.38
Mondev then brought a claim against the United States under Chapter 11 of NAFTA, alleging
violations of Articles 1102 (national treatment), 1105 (minimum standard of treatment), and
1110 (expropriation). The Chapter 11 tribunal dismissed Mondev's claims in their entirety.39
The tribunal concluded that only Mondev's Article 1105 claims were properly before it
because the alleged expropriation in violation ofArticle 1110 and the alleged discrimination
in violation of Article 1102 had both occurred prior to NAFTA's entry into force on January 1,
1994, and NAFTA is not retrospective.4 °
The tribunal accepted the clarifications of Article 1105(1) issued by the NAFTA Free Trade
Commission (FTC) as legitimate. 4' The tribunal further noted, however, that customary international law evolves, and concluded that the phrase "customary international law" in the
FTC's interpretation "refers to customary international law as it stood no earlier than the
time at which NALFTA came into force. 42 The tribunal therefore rejected the suggestion that
the minimum standard be limited to the standard articulated by the Mexican Claims Commission in the Neercase-that "the treatment of an alien ... should amount to an outrage,
to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of governmental action so far
short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency."43
36 Mondev Int'l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2 (NAFFA Ch. 11 Arb.Trib. Oct. 11, 2002),
42 I.M 85 (2003), at<http://,vw.state.gov/documents/organization/14442.pdf> [hereinafter Mondev award (merits)].
s Lafayette Place Assoc. v. Boston Redevelopment Authority, 694 N.E.2d 820 (Mass. 1998).
s8Lafayette Place Assoc. v. City of Boston, 525 U.S. 1177 (1999).
3 The tribunal consisted of Sir Ninian Stephan (president), James Crawford, and judge Stephen Schwebel.
4oMondev awrd (merits), supra note 36, paras. 57-75. Alternatively, the tribunal suggested that these claims would
have been barred by the three-year statute of limitations. See NAFrA, supra note 1,Art. 1116(2) ("An investor may not
make a claim if more than three years have elapsed from the date on which the investor first acquired, or should have
or damage.); see also
first acquired, knowledge of the alleged breach and knowledge that the investor has incurred loss
id., Art. 1117(2). The tribunal said it would not have accepted Mondev's argument that it Cotld not have had "knowledge
of... loss or damage" prior to the court decisions denying it relief. Mondev award (merits), supra note 36, para. 87.
" Mondev award (merits), supra note 36, paras. 121-22; see supra note 18.
42 Mondev award (merits), supra note 36, para. 125.
" Neer (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States, 4 R.I.A.A. 60 (U.S.-Mexico Gen'l Claims Comm'n) (1926); seeMondev
award (merits), supra note 36, paras. 114-17, 125.
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The tribunal then turned to consider the specific standard for denial ofjustice claims, emphasizing "the importance of the specific context in which an Article 1105 (1) claim is made.""
It is one thing to deal with unremedied acts of the local constabulary and another to
second-guess the reasoned decisions of the highest courts of a State. Under NAFTA, parties have the option to seek local remedies. If they do so and lose on the merits, it is not
the function of NAFTA tribunals to act as courts of appeal.45
Building on the ELSIcase's description of arbitrary conduct as that which displays "a wilful
disregard of due process of law ....which shocks, or at least surprises, a sense ofjudicial propriety,"" the tribunal articulated the following standard for denial ofjustice:
The test is not whether a particular result is surprising, but whether the shock or surprise occasioned to an impartial tribunal leads, on reflection, to justified concerns as to
thejudicial propriety of the outcome, bearing in mind on the one hand that international
tribunals are not courts of appeal, and on the other hand that Chapter 11 of NAFrA (like
other treaties for the protection of investments) is intended to provide a real measure
of protection. In the end the question is whether, at an international level and having
regard to generally accepted standards of the administration ofjustice, a tribunal can
conclude in the light of all the available facts that the impugned decision was clearly improper and discreditable, with
47 the result that the investment has been subjected to unfair
and inequitable treatment.
Applying this standard to Mondev's claim, the tribunal found no denial ofjustice. The SJC's
dismissal of LPA's contract claim against the City based on LPA's failure to tender its own
performance was simply an application of existing Massachusetts law, or at most the development of Massachusetts law "within the limits of common law adjudication. There is nothing
here to shock or surprise even a delicate judicial sensibility."48 Turning to the SJC's decision
that BRA was statutorially immune from tort liability, the tribunal reasoned that, "within broad
limits, the extent to which a State decides to immunize regulatory authorities from suit for
interference with contractual relations is a matter for the competent organs of the State to
decide,"4 9 that there were legitimate reasons why a legislature might wish to so immunize a
redevelopment agency, and that there was thus no breach of Article 1105 in this case.5"

Both the Loewen and the Mondev tribunals repeatedly emphasized that it was not their
function to serve as courts of appeal from domestic decisions,51 but because of differences in
the cases, each tribunal interpreted that principle in a different way. The Loewen tribunal
required that a Chapter 11 claimant wishing to challenge ajudicial decision first exhaust its
domestic remedies; the concern was that a failure to require exhaustion "would encourage
"' Mondev award (merits), supra note 36, para. 126.
45 Id.

4
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 ICJ REP. 15, 76 (July 20).
47
Mondevaward (merits), supra note 36, para. 127. The tribunal conceded that" [t]
his is admittedly a somewhat
open-ended standard, but it may be that in practice no more precise formula can be offered to cover the range

of possibilities." Id.
" Id., para.133. After examining Mondev's claims that the Massachusetts SupremeJudicial Court should have
remanded the contract claim and considered whether its allegedly new rule should have been applied retrospectively, the tribunal concluded that these questions were matters of local practice and did not constitute denials ofjustice.

Id., paras. 135-38.
4 Id., para. 154.

IId., paras. 153-54.
5 See supra notes 26, 35, 45, 47 and accompanying text; see also Loewen award (merits), supra note 2, para. 51

("The Tribunal cannot under the guise of a NAFTA claim entertain what is in substance an appeal from a domestic
judgment."); id., para. 134 ("A NAFTA claim cannot be converted into an appeal against the decisions of municipal
courts."); Mondev award (merits), supranote 36, para. 136 ("On the approach adopted by Mondev, NAFrA tribunals
would turn into courts of appeal, which is not their role.").
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resort to NAFTA tribunals rather than resort to the appellate courts and review processes of
the host State." 52 By contrast, the Mondev tribunal adopted a deferential "clearly improper and
discreditable" standard for reviewing domestic decisions,53 reasoning that "[i] t is one thing
to deal with unremedied acts of the local constabulary and another to second-guess the reasoned decisions of the highest courts of a State. ' 54 These two strategies to avoid acting as courts
of appeal are in tension, however, for if one requires exhaustion of domestic remedies and
applies a deferential standard of review to those domestic decisions, the result may be to insulate violations of Chapter 11 from effective review by international tribunals.
As a matter of policy, there is much to be said for requiring exhaustion of domestic remedies before allowing an investor to bring claims before a Chapter 11 tribunal. From the state's
point of view, an exhaustion requirement "afford [s] the State the opportunity of redressing
through its legal system the inchoate breach of international law occasioned by the lower
court decision."55 From the investor's point of view, "domestic appeal or review would offer
more wide-ranging review as they are not confined to breaches of international law."56 One
might also add that domestic court review is more determinate (because domestic law tends
to be better developed), more accountable (because domestic courts are less insulated from
review), and more legitimate (legitimacy being a function of both accountability and determinacy) than review by Chapter 11 tribunals.57 And although the Loewen tribunal limited its
exhaustion requirement to judicial decisions, the same factors argue in favor of requiring
exhaustion of domestic remedies with respect to other measures alleged to violate Chapter 11.58
As desirable as an exhaustion requirement may be in theory, however, the Loewen award is
in considerable tension with the text of NAFTA and the decisions of other Chapter 11 tribunals. Customary international law requires the exhaustion of local remedies before bringing
an international claim, 59 but this rule may be waived by international agreement. 60 NAFTA
Article 1121 establishes that, as a condition precedent to bringing a Chapter 11 claim, the
52

Loewen award (merits), supra note 2, para. 162.

5 Mondev award (merits), supra note 36, para. 127.
54Id., para. 126.

5 Loewen award (merits), supra note 2, para. 156.
para. 162. LG could, for example, have challenged the punitive damages award as excessive under Mississippi
law, see Miss. Code Ann. §11-1-65 (2001), AndrewJackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So. 2d 1172 (Miss. 1990), and
under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003), BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
Domestic appeals could be made more effective in redressing Chapter 11 violations if U.S. and Canadian implementing legislation were changed to make NAFfA enforceable in domestic court. See 19 U.S.C.A. §3312(c) (2) ("No
person other than the United States... may challenge, in any action brought under any provision of law, any action
or inaction by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States, any State, or any political
subdivision of a State on the ground that such action or inaction is inconsistent with the [NAFrA]."); North American
56 Id.,

Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, ch. 44, 1993 S.C. 1924-25 (Can.) ("Subject to Section B of Chapter
Eleven of the Agreement, no person has any cause of action and no proceedings of any kind shall be taken, without
the consent of the Attorney General of Canada, to enforce or determine any right or obligation that is claimed or
arises solely under or by virtue of the Agreement."). Investors may raise Chapter 11 claims in Mexican courts but
are subsequently precluded from raising the same claims before a NAFTA tribunal. See NAFTA, Annex 1120.1 (a)
("an investor of another Party may not allege that Mexico has breached an obligation under [NAFTA] ... both in
an arbitration under this Section and in proceedings before a Mexican court or administrative tribunal").
17William S. Dodge, Loewen v. United States: Trials and ErrorsUnder NAFI'A ChapterEleven, 52 DEPAUL L. REv.
563, 570-71 (2002) (published before the Loewen tribunal's award on the merits); see also Charles H. Brower II,
Structure, Legitimacy, and NAFTA's Investment Chapter,36 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37 (2003) (discussing legitimacy of
Chapter 11 review).
s Dodge, supra note 57, at 575-77. This discussion assumes that domestic courts provide adequate remedies.
U.S. and Canadian courts certainly do, and the same is probably true of Mexican courts. Customary international
law excuses a claimant from exhausting local remedies when doing so would be futile. See C. F. AMERASINGHE, LOCAL
REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 193-94 (1990).
" Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 ICJ REp. 5, 27 (Mar. 21) ("The rule that local remedies must be exhausted
before international proceedings may be instituted is a well-established rule of customary international law."); see
generally AMERASINGHE, supra note 58.
' Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States v. Italy), 1989 ICJ REP. 15, 42 (July 20) (expressing "no doubt
that the parties to a treaty can therein either agree that the local remedies rule shall not apply to claims based on
alleged breaches of that treaty"); seeAMERASINGHE, supranote 58, at 251-75.
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claimant waive its "right to initiate or continue before any administrative tribunal or court" any
proceedings with respect to the measure alleged to breach NAFTA, "except for proceedings
for injunctive, declaratory or other extraordinary relief, not involving the payment of damages."'61 Other NAFI'A tribunals have unanimously concluded that Article 1121 waives the local
remedies rule for Chapter 11 claims.62 Of course, the awards cited did not involve challenges
to domestic court decisions, and the Loewen tribunal distinguished its substantive rule of
judicial finality from the procedural requirements of the local remedies rule. 63 But Loewen does
squarely conflict on this point with Mondev, which did involve a challenge to a domestic court
decision. The Mondev tribunal assumed that an investor claiming denial ofjustice was not
required to exhaust domestic remedies:
[U] nder the system of Chapter 11, it will be a matter for the investor to decide whether
to commence arbitration immediately, with the concomitant requirement under Article
1121 of a waiver of any further recourse to any local remedies in the host State, or whether
initially to claim damages with respect to the measure before the local courts.... Thus
under NAFTA it is not true that the denial ofjustice rule and the exhaustion of local remedies rule "are interlocking and inseparable.""
Indeed, the Mondev tribunal justified its deferential standard of review, at least in part, on
the ground that the investor had chosen to appeal through the Massachusetts courts: "Under
NAFTA, parties have the option to seek local remedies. If they do so and lose on the merits,
it is not the function of NAFTA tribunals to act as courts of appeal."65
The Mondev tribunal's alternative strategy to avoid functioning as a court of appeal was to
adopt a deferential standard for denial ofjustice claims. It is noteworthy that Mondev supported this approach with a quotation from the Chapter 11 award in Azinian v. Mexico: "The
possibility of holding a State internationally liable forjudicial decisions does not, however,
entitle a claimant to seek international review of the national court decisions as though the
internationaljurisdiction seised has plenary appellatejurisdiction. This is not true generally,
and it is not true for NAFTA." 6 6 In Azinian the investors had appealed a city council decision
annulling their concession contract to the Mexican courts, and lost. The Chapter 11 tribunal
suggested that Mexican court decisions should be given resjudicata effect, thereby foreclosing
the investors' expropriation claims unless the Mexican decisions themselves constituted a
denial ofjustice.6 7 The Mondev-Azinian approach of denying an investor two bites at the apple
seems premised on the notion that if the investor chooses to pursue its claims in domestic court,
it should have to live with the result absent an extraordinary miscarriage ofjustice.
61 NAFrA, supra note
62

1,Arts. 1121 (1)(b), 1121(2) (b).
SeeFeldman v.Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, para.73 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Dec. 16,2002), 42 ILM
625, 639 (2003) ("Article 1121(2) (b) and (3) substitutes itself as a qualified and special rule on the relationship
between domestic and international judicial proceedings, and a departure from the general rule of customary
international lawon the exhaustion of local remedies."); Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico, Mexico's Preliminary
Objection Concerning the Previous Proceedings, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, para.30 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb.Trib.
June 26,2002), 41 ILM 1315,1321 (2002) ("In common with almost all investment treaties, there is no requirement
of exhaustion of local remedies."); Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, IGSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, para.97 n.4 (NAF-rA
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 30, 2000), 40 ILM 36, 49 n.4 (2001) ("Mexico does not insist that local remedies must be
exhausted. Mexico's position is correct in lightof NAFtA Article 1121(2) (b) ....");see alsoWilliam S. Dodge, National
Courts and InternationalArbitration:Exhaustion of Remedies and ResJudicata Under ChapterEleven of NAFTA, 23 HASTINGS
INT'L & CoMp.L. REv. 357, 373-76 (2000) (arguing that Article 1121 waives the local remedies rule).
63 See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
Mondev award (merits), supra note 36, para. 96 (quoting C. EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 (1928)).

Id., para. 126.
Id. (quoting Azinian v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/2, para.99 (NAFTA Ch. 11Arb. Trib. Nov. 1, 1999),
39 67ILM 537, 552 (2000)).
Azinian v. Mexico, paras. 96-100, 39 ILM at 551-52. The rule in customary international law is that the decisions of domestic courts do not bind international tribunals as resjudicata. See, e.g., Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic
of Indonesia (Nov. 20, 1984), 1 ICSID REP. 413,460 (1993) ("an international tribunal is not bound to follow the result
of a national court"). For further discussion, see Dodge, supra note 62, at 365-370, 376-83.
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The Mondev-Azinian deference to domestic court decisions is open to criticism, howeverwhether exhaustion is required or not. Without an exhaustion requirement, such deference
will "encourage resort to NAFTA tribunals rather than resort to the appellate courts and review
processes of the host State."' Indeed, this dynamic is likely to be strongest for those investors
with the weakest claims. "An investor that doubts its chances of success in a domestic appeal
may nevertheless be willing to gamble on getting a sympathetic Chapter 11 tribunal whose
decision will be largely insulated from review." 69 But with an exhaustion requirement, one
of the principal justifications for deference disappears, for one cannot fault an investor for
taking two bites at the apple if it was forced to take the first bite.7" Moreover, if an investor is
required to exhaust its remedies in domestic court and if arbitral tribunals then defer to the
decisions of those courts, investors may be denied the "real measure of protection"71 that
Chapter 11 is intended to provide.
At present, the problem is not grave. Mondev's "clearly improper and discreditable" standard, 2 while deferential, plainly allows more meaningful review than the "outrage" standard
of the Neercase that the Mondevtribunal rejected. 73 Loewen's exhaustion requirement applies
only tojudicial decisions and not to other measures alleged to breach Chapter I 74Given
the different directions in which these two awards point, however, it is apparent that the relationship between domestic courts and NAFFA Chapter 11 tribunals still needs to be worked
out. My own view is that investors should be required to exhaust their remedies in domestic
courts before bringing Chapter 11 claims, but that NAFrA tribunals should not be bound to
follow those results. 7' These rules are, of course, the ones that customary international law
has developed to mediate between national courts and international tribunals. 76 The NAFTA
parties may have been unwise to abandon them so hastily.
WILLIAM S. DODGE
University of California,Hastings College of the Law

Headquartersagreements of internationalorganizations--privilegesand immunities of international
civil servants-income taxation in Franceof retirementpensions offormer UNESCO officials
UNESCO-FRANCEARBITRATION. Award. 107 REVUE GINtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC

221 (2003).
Arbitral tribunal,January 14, 2003.
In an effort to overcome a conflict that had resisted a negotiated solution for nearly a decade,
France and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) agreed in
8 Loewen award (merits), supra note 2, para. 162; see also Azinian v. Mexico, para. 86, 39 ILM at 550 ("it would
be unfortunate if potential claimants under NAFTA were dissuaded from seeking relief under domestic law from
national courts, because such actions might have the salutary effect of resolving the dispute without resorting to
investor-state arbitration under NAFTA").
6 Dodge, supra note 57, at 575.
70See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
71 Mondev award (merits), supra note 36, paras. 119, 127.
72

Id., para. 127.

73 See supranote

43 and accompanying text. The Loewen tribunal's standard-" [m]anifest injustice in the sense of
a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends a sense ofjudicial propriety"-seems substantively identical to Mondev's. Moreover, the Loewen tribunal both quoted and applied Mondev's standard. Seesupranotes 21-22

and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
71See Dodge,

supra note 57.

76 See,

e.g., Interhandel (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 ICJ REP. 5, 27 (Mar. 21) ("The rule that local remedies must be
exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted is a well-established rule of customary international
law."); Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia (Nov. 20, 1984), 1 ICSID REP. 413,460 (1993) ("an international tribunal is not bound to follow the result of a national court"); see generally Dodge, supra note 62, at 360-70.
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